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WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE DISPOSITION OF
INSURANCE PROCEEDS?
Guy B. HORTON
I.

By LiFE COMPANIES*

The Maze and Suggested Ways Out
Few transactions may have contact with more states or countries than
settlements of insurance proceeds by the life company itself or through a life
insurance trust. The insurance company may be located in state A, the policy
may be delivered and the first premium paid in state B, to a person domiciled in C. The settlement may be arranged later while the insured is a
resident of D and when the policy matures by death or endowment he may
be living in E. The beneficiaries may be scattered among F, G, and H when
the agreement is entered into, be living in others when the policy is settled
as a death claim, and remove to still others while the proceeds are being paid.
If a settlement is made through a trust company-i.e., as a life insurance
trust- the domicil of the trustee introduces one more state with still others
possible as trustees are changed. These states may, and generally do, differ
radically in their views on perpetuities, restraints on alienation, and limitation of accumulation, to name a few of the matters that must be considered.

To find our way through this maze, we must rely on a branch of the law so
new that its rules have hardly been formulated, or at any rate, reduced to an
accepted system. Furthermore, few of the decisions are directly to a point
within the scope of tlhis work and every lawyer knows the pitfalls in reasoning by analogy.
Our study may well begin with a consideration of the choice-of-law rules
of contracts and trusts. After a general survey of them, we can consider how
they apply to our particular problem. This is about all we can do in the
present state of legal knowledge.
*Settlements of insurance in other than one sum are made by two alternate methods.
By one, the payment in instalments or interest or some combination is made by the
life company in accordance with a contract attached to the policy; by the other, the
holding and distributing is by a trustee to whom the life company pays the proceeds in
a lump sum.
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As to contracts, the field of conflict of laws is one of the most uncertain
in the law. Not only is there wide divergence in theory between different
states and even different cases in the same state, but there sometimes is a
confusion of theory within the same case." It can be said easily that in no
field of law is there so great opportunity for judges to make their own law or,
to put it more accurately, is there such easy ability to find points upon which
a rule of predetermined result can be hung.
Falconbridge has stated 2 that we may even have a conflict of conflict rules,
or in other words, a difference between a rule of conflict of laws of the forum
and the supposedly corresponding rule of conflict of laws of some other
country, or a difference between the supposedly corresponding conflict rules
of two countries other than the forum. This difference between the conflict
rules of two countries is of course to be distinguished from a difference between the local laws of the two countries, which gives rise to a question of
conflict of laws.
A question of choice of laws may arise with respect to the making of
a contract, its construction, its performance, its enforcement, or its assignment. In each of these particulars it may be claimed that the law to govern
the transaction in question is the law of the place where the contract was
made (lex loci contractus or lex loci celebrationis as it is sometimes called),
the law of the place fixed for its performance (lex loci salutionis), the law of
the place where enforcement is sought (lex loci fori), or the law of the place
of assignment.
One of the most difficult tasks confronting the student of the conflict of
laws is to distinguish the several factors of a contract, i.e., interpretation,
obligation, and performance. Professor Beale has made this as clear as language permits.3
The process of determining first the meaning, then the existence, and then
the performance of a contract is a continuous process from beginning to
end. There is no distinction based on logic alone between the processes of
determining the meaning of a contract, its initiation and obligation, and its
performance. All questions which may arise in the interpretation, obligation, or performance of a contract are logically implicit in the will of the
parties as expressed in their contract. Given the language of a contract,
interpretation makes the language, as language, clear. Construction at this
'Professor Beale has discussed this at length,
called Treatise) § 332.1 et seq. See also

CoNFLICT oF LAws (1935) (hereinafter
(1927) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107.

GOODRICH,

The
classification and interpretation of cases in law journals and decisions vary greatly.
2
haracterization in the Conflict of Laws (1927) 53 L. Q. REv. 235, 237; see also
Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions h the Conflict of Laws (1936) 21 CoRNELL L. Q.
570.
1
3
TREATISE § 346.1. This appears to be an elaboration of RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1934) § 332 comment c, and § 358 comment a and b.
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point determines the legal effect of the language in terms of obligation.
When the obligation comes to be performed, a continuation of the same
process determines whether the performance required by the contract is to
be in one form or another form. There is no logical stopping-place from
beginning to end of this process. It is clear, however, that the meaning of
the words used must depend on the intention of the parties. It is likewise
clear that the act which institutes a contract and all its immediate legal consequences are governed by the law of the place where this act is done. It is
equally clear that the actual carrying out of the obligation is governed, as all
acts are governed, by the law of the place where it is done. One law therefore applies to the initiation of a contract and another to its final performance. The point at which initiation ceases and performance begins is not a
point which can be fixed by any rule of law. Like all questions of degree, it
must depend on the circumstances of each case and must be determined by
an exercise of legal judgment by the court of the forum.
The problems are further complicated by two circumstances. In a number
of jurisdictions statutes have been passed providing that the "interpretation"
or "construction" of contracts shall be governed by the law of some particular
place. 4 Obviously the legislatures did not mean in passing these statutes that
the meaning of the language used, as language, should be determined by*some
rule of law apart from the intention of the parties, and this has been recognized frequently by the courts and has resulted in decisions 5 that such words
as "interpretation" in these statutes mean legal effect, not actual interpretation of the language used.
Moreover the obligation and effect, as well as the validity, of a transfer of
property has often been confused by the courts with the obligation and effect
of a contract to transfer property or of the contract by reason of which
the property was at once transferred. 6
A convenient criterion by which to distinguish the substance of the contract
7
from the remedy has been given the bewildered student by Professor Minor.
"Suppose the legislature of the locus contractus were to enact the law
of the forum, making it applicable to the existing contract. If the result
is that the obligation of the contract is either increased or impaired
'For example, CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1933) § 1646; applied in Ostroff v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 724 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
rSee, for example, Alcock v. Smith, (1892) 1 Ch. 238, 256; Embiricos v. AngloAustrian Bank, [1905] 1 K. B. 667.
'For examples, see H. G. Craig & Co. v. Uncas Paper Board Co., 104 Conn. 559,
133 Atl, 673 (1926); Motors Mort. Corp. v. Purchase-Money Note Co., 38 Ga. App.
222, 143 S.E. 459 (1928) ; Caldwell & Co. v. Deschanel Inter. Corp., 6 La. App. 802
(1928).
7(1903) 16 -AIv. L. IEv.262. See also Cook "Substance" and "Procedure" inthe
Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333; McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1930) 78 UG.OF PA. L. Rxv. 933.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
thereby, then the point to which the law of the forum relates is part of
the obligation or substance of the contract, and is not merely a matter of
remedy, and the lex loci, not the lex fori, should control. If, on the other
hand, the result is that the obligation of the contract is not at all affected,
being neither increased nor diminished, then the inquiry relates to a
matter of remedy only, and the lex fori should govern."
Three principal theories or rules have found support in the cases.8 First,
that the law of the place of performance governs. Second, that the parties
may select, at least within the limits of good faith, the law to govern the contract.9 Third, the view accepted by the Restatement,10 that the law of the
place of contracting governs such matters as the validity of the contract and
the natuke of the obligation, but that the law of the place of performance
governs matters relating to performance. This view, despite its vulnerability
on some points, 1 commends itself in so far as it brings into the field of
commercial transactions at least a degree of certainty.
Validity and Its Determination
Thus it may be stated as a general rule, supported by numerous well considered decisions that, in the absence of a stipulation or other evidence of a
contrary intent, the validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of
the place where the contract is made.12 Paul de Castro' 3 based the application
of the lex loci on the fiction that it is the place where the contract was born,
contracts like persons being subject, according to that writer, to the law of the
place of their origin.
The place where the contract is made is the place where the last act is
done that is necessary to make the promise complete and binding.' 4 Just
what event is the final one necessary to make a contract is to be determined
by the principles of the law of contract, and by the particular contract if it
has anything to say about it.15 In the case of the life insurance contract which
is to be in effect only on the "delivery" of the policy there is a wilderness of
'A fourth theory, based upon the rule most consistently applied in usury cases, is that
"the law which upholds the contract" is controlling. See STUmBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 212; cf. Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in the
of Laws (1921) 30 YALE L. J.565, 655, and (1922) 31 id. 53.
Conflict
9
But cf. Commissioner v. Hyde, 82 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
0
" CoNFLICr OF LAWS (1934) § 332.
'See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 173;
Cook, Contracts and the Conflict of Laws (1936) 31 ILL. L. REv. 143; Lorenzen, loc. cit.
supra note 8.
"RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 332; Am. JuRis., CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 99; COOLEY, BRImFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) 849, cases collected.

11

LAINg, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL RIvA (1888) 189.
§ 323; see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

"RE,STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)
(1927) § 104; BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1,
'BEALE,

op. cit. mtpra note 1, at § 311.1.

at § 311.1.
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decision on when the policy is in effect.ls " The problem as to where it is
in effect has not attracted so much attention.
The Function of the Forum
Determination of the place of contracting is the function of the forum.
The Restatement states the rule thus:
"The law of the forum decides as a preliminary question by the law
of which state questions arising concerning the formation of a contract
are to be determined, and this state is, in the Restatement of this subject,
called the 'place of contracting.' "16
In deciding this preliminary question, the forum ignores its own domestic
law as to whether or not, upon the facts disclosed by the record, a contract
would exist, and selects, as the law by which this ultimate question is to be
determined, the law of the state which, under the general rules of conflict of
7
laws, is decisive as to such preliminary question.'
Under its conflict-of-laws rules, in determining the place of contracting, the
forum ascertains the place in which, under the general law of contracts, the
principal event necessary to make a contract occurs. The forum at this stage
of the investigation does not seek to ascertain whether there is a contract.
It examines the facts of the transaction in question only so far as is necessary
to determine the place of the principal event, if any, which, under the general
law of contracts, would result in a contract. Then, and not until then, does
the forum refer to the law of such state to ascertain if, under that law, there
is a contract, although of course there normally will be a contract unless
the local law of contracts of the state to which reference is thus made differs
from the general law of contracts as understood at the forum.' 8
Of course all matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum,' 9
and the court at the forum determines according to its own conflict-of-laws
rule the preliminary question whether a given question is one of substance
20
or procedure.
Determining the Place of Contractingof Insurance
The place of contracting of insurance presents more than usual difficulty
due to the considerable diversity of opinion as to what constitutes the final
act necessary to complete the contract. 21 In general, it may be said that inThe Delivery of a Life Instrance Policy (1919) 33 HAgv.L. Rlv. 198.
LAWS (1934) § 311.
"Id. at § 311, comment a.
"Id. at § 311, comment d.
1
'Patterson,

"-CoNLicr OF

Id. at § 585.

"OId. at § 584. For distinction, see supra pp. 170-172.
21
See BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 317.1-319.1; GOODRICH, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS
(1927) § 104; RESTATEMENT, CoNflict oF LAws (1934) § 317-19; Patterson, The De-
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surance policies are completed where delivered, 22 except when a condition
precedent remains unsatisfied, in which case it is the place where that satisfaction occurs. 23
In one set of circumstances the last necessary act has been held to be at
the home office of the company. The first premium was paid when the application for insurance was made and, according to the custom of companies, a
"binding receipt" was given applicant providing that "insurance, subject to
the terms and conditions of the .policy contract, shall take effect as of the
date of this receipt, provided the applicant is on this date in the opinion of
the society's authorized officers in New York an insurable risk under its
rules and the application is otherwise acceptable on the plan and for the
amount and at the rate of premium originally applied for; otherwise the payment evidenced by this receipt shall be returned on demand and the surrender of this receipt". The court held that this gave the society the power
of acceptance or rejection which acted upon at the home office gave the contract situs in that state. 24 In reaching this conclusion the court exhibited
greater knowledge of law than of the facts and procedure of insurance.
Under such practice the action of the society's officers approaches the ministerial. If the applicant is an insurable risk under the society's rules, etc.,
the acceptance is automatic as of the date of the receipt for the premium;
the officers are finders of fact with no power beyond judging whether these
facts are within the rules, which judgment on that point is subject to judicial
livery of a Life Insurance Policy (1919) 33 HARv. L. Ray. 198. Annotations (1902)
63 L. R. A. 834, (1909) 23 L. R. A. (Ni. s.) 968, (1914) 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 275.
'Lando v. Equity Life Assur. Soc., 11 F. Supp. 729 (N. D. Cal. 1935), aff'd, 84 _F.
(2d) 640 (C. C. A. 9th 1936); see Martin v. Zurich Gen. Accid. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
84 F. (2d) 6, 8 (C. C. A. 1st 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 43 (1936). Where the
policy is mailed directly to the applicant, the place of contracting is where the policy
is posted: Oliver v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 76 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A.
8th 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 582 (1935). Where the insurance company retains
control of the policy by sending it to its agent to give to the assured, there is no
delivery until the agent hands oyer the policy: Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Gerwick,
50 Ohio App. 277, 197 N. E. 923 (1934). But cf. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v.
Nikolopulos, 86 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 3d 1936); Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
158 Misc. 466, 286 N. Y. Supp. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
'Delivery and payment: Boseman v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 57 U. S. 686 (1937);
industrial group insurance contract: Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Standfier, 86 S. W. (2d)
852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; delivery and payment while insured in good health: Mutual
Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Ossen, 77 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
616 (1935); delivery, payment, and countersignature of agent: Hartliep Transit Co. v.
Central Mut. Ins. Co., 5 N. E. (2d) 879 (.Il. App. 1936) ; written acknowledgment
of acceptance by assured: Bukowski v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 261 N. W. 783 (Iowa
1935) ; acceptance of application for reinstatement: Westun v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 12 F. (2d) 422 (C. C. A. 8th 1926); acceptance of request to extend time of
paying premiums: Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 41 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A.
8th 1930).
'Fields v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 118 S. W. 521 (Mo. 1938). Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 96 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) is similar both in the holding
and in the failure to give proper effect to insurance procedure.
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control. The whole value of such prepayment insurance comes from the nonexistence of acceptance privilege by the insurance company.
Intent as Determining Choice of Law
Intent of the parties to the contract or trust as determinative of choice of
law is a device perhaps increasingly resorted to. If it will work, it easily
may solve our problem. Unfortunately, the idea contains two weaknesses.
The first lies in the determination of itself. In what way is the intent disclosed? Generally, it is by the circumstances of the contracting or of the
creation of the trust relation. That being so, one might better evaluate those
factors directly. In other words, intent often does no more than beg the
question, with the laughable result that the elements determining it are often
the factors which courts disregarding intent have made use of in their choice
of law. It might, perhaps, be argued with fair success that all the cases may
be harmonized on the principle that the law of the contract is that with
reference to which the parties intended to contract. But aside from theoretical objection to the adoption of intent as a universal criterion it furnishes
but little assistance in most of the cases. As was said by the Minnesota
Supreme Court:
"In a search for the actual intent of the parties when none is expressed, there is an element of legal jugglery. Usually parties-to transactions of this nature, referable to one state or another, or in part to
one state and in part to another, have no unexpressed but [or?] actual
intent as to the law which shall control. The question of what law
governs does not suggest itself to them." 25
a. STIPULATION AND ITS LIMITATION BY PUBLIC POLICY
Suppose, then, we determine the intent by stipulating in the contract or
trust instrument that the law of a particular jurisdiction shall govern. Such
solution by expressed intent or choice of law by the parties has been both
attacked and defended, each quite forcibly. Beale26 opposes on the ground
that it practically makes a legislative body of any two persons who choose
to get together and contract. "The theory means", he says, "that since the
parties can adopt any foreign law at their pleasure to govern their acts, they
can at their will free themselves from the power of the law which otherwise
would apply to their acts. '27 Cavers 28 defends it with equal force. Both
'Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229 (1914).
'Op. cit. supra note 1, at § 332.2.
'See Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 13 N. E. (2d) 299 (Mass. 1938).

Judge

Learned Hand in Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 48 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 2d 1931)

characterized an attempt to determine by a declaration of intention the law governing
the contract as an effort "to pull on one's bootstraps", to which Professor Cavers rejoins
that "This method of levitation actually works in many jurisdictions both here and
abroad".
'Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HIv. L. Rav. 191-8. So
does Walter W. Cook as to contracts in (1938) 32 IL. L. REV. 899.
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concede that some limitation or qualification is necessary and find it in the
condition that the choice must be bona fide and (what is an application of the
good faith) the selected state must have a substantial connection with the
transaction.
One recent case supports the theory of legislation by stipulation. A life
company in settlement of its policy issued at its home office in New York
certificates of payment in monthly instalments which benefits, the certificate
stated, should not be transferable nor subject to commutation or encumbrance, nor to legal process except on action for necessaries. They provided
also that payment should be made in New York and that all rights should be
governed by the law of that state. In proceedings in Michigan by a creditor
of the beneficiary residing in that state, the court applied the New York pro29
vision, against the claim that the Michigan exception applied.
Another condition or qualification must be met. The contract must not
violate a statute of the state of contract,30 or, if given force, accomplish some
evasion of statutory provisions declaring a rule of public policy with reference to contracts made within its jurisdiction,31 or the contract stipulation
violate the interests and public policy of the state.3 2 In short, it is competent
for the parties to select a state to which the transaction is referable "if done
without an intent to evade." 8 3 One court states the rule thus, citing the
United States Supreme Court :34
"We adopt the views of the Supreme Court therein expressed which
are to the effect that, where an insurance company does business in this
state and issue's its policies to residents of this state, the validity of clauses
in its policies must be determined by the laws of this state. The laws
of this state establish a rule of public policy which overrides the freedom of contract of the parties and makes waivers of statutory provisions
ineffectual although
such waivers are contained in the strongest terms
35
in the policy.1
So, North Carolina has held void a provision that "this contract shall be
governed by, subject to, and construed only according to the laws of the state
'Annis v. Pilkewitz, 282 N. W. 905 (Mich. 1938).

'Saunders v. Union Central Life, 212 Mo. App. 186, 253 S. W. 177 (1923). See
Boole v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (1921).
'Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 119 Fed. 629 (D. Mass. 1902).
"N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S.389, 20 Sup. Ct. 962 (1900), aff'g Cravens
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 50 S.W. 519, 53 L. R. A. 305, 71 Am. St. Rep.
628 (1899). And see Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 52 S.W. 356
(1899) and Summers v. Fidelity Mut. Aid. Ass'n, 84 Mo. App. 605 (1900).
'Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229 (1914). See as to
the limitations generally, Helm Bruce, By the Law of What State Are Questions Arising
out of Life Insurance Policies to Be Determined? (1920) Ass'N. LIFE COUNSEL No. 45.
'Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 140 U. S.226, 11 Sup. Ct. 822 (1891).
'Price v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 281 (1892). The question is repeated and followed in Hoffman v. No. American Union, 56 S.W. 599 (Mo. 1933)
and Ragsdale v. Brotherhood, 229 Mo. App. 545, 80 S.W. 272 (1935).
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of New York, the place of this contract being expressly agreed to be the
home office of said association in the city of New York," so far as its enforcement in the courts of another state is concerned 3 6 In other states express contract stipulations as to governing laws have not been accepted,37
some as the result of statutory regulations.38
Even without stipulation, i.e., when intent is to be inferred from facts, the
comity of states cannot be pushed too far.3 9 A state will not recognize the
rule and accept the law of another state if "incompatible with its own authority or prejudicial to the interests of its own subjects". 4 It is not unconstitutional for the court of the place of performance of a contract made
elsewhere and valid where made to refuse to enforce it if its performance is
illegal by the law of the place of performance. 41 As the Restatement puts it,
"No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the enfdrcement
of which is contrary to the strong public
'42
policy of the forum.
This makes a distinction between a policy denying access to courts and
a policy refusing to apply foreign rule of law. The rule just quoted from the
Restatement is applicable when the entire basis of the claim upon which
suit is brought is so contrary to the public policy of the forum that it will
withhold altogether the use of its courts to enforce the claim. A distinction
is to be noted between such a policy and the policy which, while it does not
require denial of access to the courts of the forum, nevertheless requires the
courts to apply certain local rules in the course of the litigation to enforce
the local notions concerning the manner and method in which the courts of
'Blackwell v. Mutual R. F. Life Ass'n, 141 N. C. 117, 53 S. E. 833, 5 L. R. A. (N. s.)
771, 115 Am. St. Rep. 677 (1906).
"Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 24 Sup. Ct. 538 (1904), rev'g 55 C. C. A.
536, 118 Fed. 708 (1902) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. McRee, 75 Fla. 257, 78 So. "22
(1918) ; Dolan v. Mutual R. F. Life Ass'n, 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398 (1899).
IHorton v. Home Ins. Co., 122 N. C. 498, 29 S. E. 944, 65 Am. St. Rep. 717 (1898);
Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 124 N. C. 116, 32 S. E. 404 (1899).
And see Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Miazza, 93 Miss. 18, 46 So. 817 (1908) ; Albert
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 N. C. 92, 30 S. E. 327, 65 Am. St. Rep. 693 (1898). Cf.
Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420, 45 A. L. R. 618 (1926) wherein the
court, referring to the life policy in suit, remarked that it was a New York contract,
and that the decisions of that state were pertinent. Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
180 Mass. 407, 63 L. R. A. 833, 62 N. E. 733 (1902) ; Continental Ins. Co. v. Perry,
138 Tenn. 205, 197 S. W. 487 (1917) following the New York holding that unearned
premium must be returned, or tendered, with notice of cancellation; Wentworth v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 65 Utah 581, 238 Pac. 648 (1925).
'In (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 508 the cases are collected on the Public Policy Concept
in the Conflict of Laws.
'Skiff v. Solace, 23 Vt. 279 (1851); Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45,
236 Pac. 513 (1925).
'Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 124 (1927), aff'g 169
Minn. 516, 211 N. W. 478 (1926).
'CoNFrLIcr oF LAWs (1934) § 612.

178

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

that state should function. This latter policy may be called the procedural policy of the forum. This procedural policy differs from the policy
which denies access to the local courts under the rule stated above in the
following respect: In the former case, the legal relations between the parties
as determined by the foreign law will be enforced subject to certain limitations imposed by local rules; in the latter situation the state refuses altogether to enforce the legal relations created by the foreign law.43 A Tennessee court,44 relying on section 612 of the Restatement (quoted supra) dismissed a suit on a promissory note executed in Pennsylvania in consideration
of an agreement not to prosecute the defendant for a felony for which he had
been indicted in Florida. Under Pennsylvania law such an agreement is
45
valid; in Tennessee parties to it are guilty of a misdemeanor.
The public policy concept may, as in Mertz v. MertZ,4 6 prevent recovery
when the foreign law which is relied upon would have allowed it, or it may
nullify a defense so that recovery may be had when the foreign law would
47
have denied it.
A few cases may be referred to as illustrating these principles. Courts
which declare a contract void as against public policy are not declaring the
intention of the parties, as in the ordinary case, but are acting under the
obligation of the higher law, which requires the enforcement of that which
is for the public good.48 The refusal of a court to enforce a foreign contract
depends upon how far it is a matter affecting the settled and uniform policy
of the state, so as to be applicable to all similar transactions without the state,
something local and permanent, pertaining to the local policy of the forum
which is not transitory or a thing pertaining to the contract. If it is of this
character, it has been said that it can no more be dispensed with, out of
deference to the law governing a foreign contract, than could the institution
of religion or the fundamental principles of morality.49 Both the elementary

'3Id. at § 612, comment a.

"Windt v. Lindy, 169 Tenn. 210, 84 S.W. (2d) 99 (1935).
"Accord: Kaufman v. Gerson, [1904) 1 K. B. 591. Gambling contracts valid by the
law of the place of contract are generally unenforceable if they would have been illegal
in the jurisdiction of the forum: Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co., 57 S.W. (2d)
1091 (Mo. App. 1933). Foreign contracts usurious by the law of the forum have been
denied enforcement: Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255
N. W. 558 (1934). Contra: George v. Haas, 311 1C:382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924).
"6271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936). But in Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich.
536, 268 N. W. 833 (1936) the Supreme Court of Michigan reached the opposite conclusion.
"'E.g., Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Co., 39 N. M. 256, 45 P. (2d) 927 (1935) ; cf.
The Kensington, 183 U. S.263, 22 Sup. Ct. 102 (1902) ; Straus v. Canadian Pac. Ry.,
254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930) ; see note (1936) 45 YAL.E L. J.1463, 1469. The
Restatement seems to refer only to the first type, see § 612.
'Hughes v. Penn. R. Co., 202 Pa. 222, 51 Atl. 990, 63 L. R. A. 513, 59 Am. St. Rep.
713 (1902).
"Rice v. Courtis, 32 Vt. 460, 78 Am. Dec. 597 (1860).
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principles that the lex loci governs and that the intention of the parties will
be sought out and enforced "are subordinate to, and qualified by, the doctrine that neither by comity nor by the will of contracting parties can the
public policy of a country be set at naught." 50 The parties to a contract may
not by their intention, however expressed, override the laws of the country
in which suit is brought, when a matter of the public policy of that country
is involved. 51 As it is peculiarly within the province of the lawmaking power
to define the public policy of the state, where that power has been exerted
in such a way as to manifest that a violation of public policy would result
from the enforcement of a foreign contract validly entered into under a
foreign law, comity will yield to the manifestation of the legislative will and
52
enforcement will not be permitted.
As to the definition of public policy the courts are polarized about two
different conceptions. One is that public policy applies only where enforcement of the foreign-based claim would be pernicious to the interests of the
forum or repugnant to morals or natural justice.53 The other confines it to
the law of the state found in its constitution, statutes and decisional doctrines. 54 An adverse public policy is not indicated by a shorter period of
suspension, in this case, for accumulation.r5
Determining the Place of Performance
Determination of the place of performance of an insurance contract has its
difficulties though they are not so numerous as in determining the place of
making the contract. The Restatement as to contracts generally says:
"The rule of the place of performance is the state where, either by
specific provision or by interpretation of the language of the promise, the
promise is to be performed." 56
Notwithstanding the presumption that in the absence of expressions of
contrary intent, performance must be rendered at the place of contracting,
rGrosman v. Union Trust Co., 228 Fed. 610, Ann. Cas. 1917B 613 (C. C. A. 5th
1916), aff'd, 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147 (1918). The quotation is from The
Kensington, 183 U. S. 269, 22 Sup. Ct. 104 (1902).
mCompania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortg. Bank, 269 N. Y. 22,
198 N. E. 617, 101 A. L. R. 1313 (1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 705, 56 Sup. Ct. 443

(1936).
OBond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15, 37 Sup. Ct. 366 (1917).
'4Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937), citing Hollis
v.(1810).
Drew Theological Sem., 95 N. Y. 166. Cf. Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358, 378
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).

Shannon v. Irving Trust

Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937). Cf. Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky
Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255 N. W. 558 (1934). See, The Public Policy Concept in
the Conflict of Laws (1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 508.
'Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. (2d) 792 (1937).
CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 355.
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there are numerous assertions in the decisions that in the case of a debt the
place of payment is presumably the residence or place of business of the
creditor. 57 Says one court,
"The very nature of a policy of insurance strongly implies that in the
event of loss within its terms, the amount coming due will be delivered
to the beneficiary. The most reasonable inference is that this delivery
is to take place where the beneficiary resides or is to be found." 8
One case has held that the place of performance of the life insurer's promise
to pay is the place where the insured dies, 59 which would seem to be stretching the intention of the parties a bit too far, since there is no guaranty that
the insured will die even in the continent where the insurance contract was
made.
The place where the insurance policy is made payable by the contract is
60
not the place of performance necessarily. In Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Standfier
a statute of the place of contracting which provided for the payment of
attorney's fees and the imposition of a penalty on the failure of the insurer
to pay promptly was applied to a policy which was expressly payable in
another state. So policies issued by the company in state N were held to be
construed by the laws of state M, where application was made, the premium
paid, the policy delivered, the insured and beneficiary lived, and the company
did business, although proceeds at maturity were to be paid at the home
office."'

Specific Questions and the Law By Which Answered
The question of what is the obligation imposed by a contract of insurance,
what are its terms and provisions, has usually rightly been held to be governed by the law of the place of contracting. Thus, there being no different
place of performance or intention of the parties, the law of the place of contracting has been held to govern the right of insured to change the bene03
ficiary, 62 and if the right exists, what is the proper method of doing so, who
is eligible to be beneficiary, and whether the right of a beneficiary, the wife
of the insured, is lost by divorce.64 But the law of the place of performance
IBEM.E, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 355.1.
'Clark v. Policyholders Life Ins. Ass'n, 138 Cal. App. 505, 32 P. (2d) 653 (1934).
6'Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 190 Mo. App. 703, 176 S. W. 266 (1915).
w86 S. W. (2d) 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
'Wilde v. Wilde, 209 Mass. 205, 95 N. E. 295 (1911).
2Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1929)

(disregarding the law

of insurer's domicil); Orthwein v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 261 Mo. 650, 170 S. W.
885 (1914); Haven v. Home Ins. Co., 149 Mo. App. 291, 130 S. W. 73 (1921) (disregarding the law stipulated for).
3Modern Woodmen v. Myers, 99 Ohio St. 87, 124 N. E. 48 (1918).
"Pendleton v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 135 Okla. 40, 273 Pac. 1007 (1929).
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governs in determining who is the right person to whom performance (payment) should be given, that is, who is the beneficiary, as distinguished from
who may be the beneficiary. It governs the manner of fulfilling the obligation and the details of doing so. It governs in determining the hour or day
performance is to be rendered and the medium of payment and of course it
determines if a breach has occurred. 65
a.

MEANING OF LANGUAGE

It is the general rule that the language used in a life insurance policy,
designating the beneficiary (subject to statutory or charter restrictions as to
who may be designated), is to be regarded as the language of the insured
alone and is to be treated as of a testamentary character, receiving as nearly
as possible the same construction as if used in a will under the same circumstances. 66 Hence, the phrase "heirs" or "heirs at law", etc., in a policy of
life insurance is to be construed, in the absence of evidence of a contrary
intent, in accordance with the lex domicilii of the insured, though the insurance contract is entered into or payable in another state, by whose law such
terms would be given a different meaning. 67 So as to the persons coming
within the designation of "children". 6
The parties' intention governs the meaning of the words used when that
is apparent. "This", as Professor Goodrich points out,6 9 "is a wholly different point from that involved in allowing them to choose the law to govern
the obligation. Here there is no question of validity; the sole question is that
of fixing the meaning of language, and there is no more difficulty in giving
effect to a Texas use of a term in a Missouri contract than in giving effect to
French or German instead of English as a means of expression, providing
the parties show what they mean."
If a change of domicil occurs between the time the contract was made and
the time of insured's death, the domicil when beneficiary was designated
'Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. McRee, 75 Fla. 257, 78 So. 22 (1918) ; Booz v. Booz,
183 Iowa 381, 167 N. W. 93 (1918); Weiditschka v. Supreme Tent, 188 Iowa 183,
170 N. W. 300 (1920), rehearing denied, 188 Iowa 183, 175 N. W. 835 (1920). In none of
these cases did a place of contracting differ from the place of performance apparently.
But in Millard v. Brayton, 177 Mass. 533, 59 N. E. 436 (1901) it was held that the
law of the place of contracting, not that of performance, governs in determining who
is entitled to payment if the beneficiary predeceases the insured.
'Knights Templar etc. Ass'n v. Greene, 79 Fed. 461 (S. D. Ohio 1897). A general
discussion of the cases is found in (1904) 63 L. R. A. 856; (1910) 23 L. R. A. (N. s.)
975-8; (1914) 52 L. R. A. (x. s.) 279.
071uights Templar etc. Ass'n v. Greene, supra note 66; Northwestern Masonic Aid
Ass'n v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99, 26 Atl. 253 (1893) ; BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 342.2;
MINoR, CONFLICr OF LAws (1901) § 186.
'Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Webb, 54 Ala. 688 (1875).
'Op. cit. mtpra note 1, at § 109.
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prevails.7" In the Connecticut case of Mullen v. Reed,71 a life insurance
policy was issued in Massachusetts to a resident of that state, being written
in favor of the assured's "heirs at law". The assured afterwards changed his
domicil to Connecticut and died there. The court held that the law of Massachusetts, not that of Connecticut, should control the meaning to be attached
to the phrase. Professor Minor says 72 this decision was clearly correct; for
whatever the rule may be touching the law that should govern the interpretation of a revocable will, upon a change of the testator's dcomicil, the
above rule must be applied to a contract whose obligation attaches at the
time it is made, and cannot afterwards be altered save by the mutual consent of the parties.
The problem is the same in construing that word in a trust deed, where
it is held to mean the persons who satisfy that description according to the
law of the domicil of the trustor or testator at the time of the execution of
the instrument. 73 The construction of the word is the same in a will. 7 4 In
a case of two trustors with different domicils and the situs of the property
and of the cestui was at the domicil of one of them, the instrument was
interpreted according to the law of that state,75 and this rule is adopted
76
by the Restatement.

b.

CONSUMMATION OF POLICY RIGHTS

Analogy and an easy habit of thought might lead one to govern the exercise of an option in a contract by the law of the place where the exercise or
selection occurs. Yet that may be wrong. Contracts which are mere consummations of a policy are made where the original policy was made because
they are the fruitage merely of rights created or reserved by the original
contract. Changing the beneficiary, for example, is just one of the things
which the insurance company agreed to do on request, so its validity and
effect is determined by the law of the place where the insurance contract was
made,77 and this is so although the policy said another state should govern ;78
"Mullen v. Reed, 64 Conn. 240, 29 Ati. 478 (1894).
"'Ibid.
'Op. cit. supra note 67, at § 186.
"Clow v. Hosier, 258 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. Cal. 1919); Merrill v. Preston, 135 Mass.
451 (1883); Codman v. Krell, 152 Mass. 214, 25 N. E. 90 (1890); City Bank F. T.
Co. v. Whiting, 241 N. Y. Supp. 398 (1930); In re Bankes, [1902] 2 Ch. 333.
"'Lincoln v. Aldrich, 149 Mass. 368, 21 N. E. 671 (1889). Otherwise in Alabama:
Price v. Tally's Adm'r, 10 Ala. 946 (1847).
uCurtis v. Curtis, 138 App. Div. 208, 123 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't 1918); commented on in (1919) 32 HARv.L. Rlv. 729.
""CONFLICT OF LAWs (1934)

§ 296, comment b.

'Hoskins v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1929) (whether insured has
right to change) ; Orthwein v. Germania Life, 261 Mo. 650, 170 S. W. 885 (1914) ;
Pendleton v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 135 Okla. 40, 273 Pac. 1007 (1929) ; National
Trust Co. v. Hughes, 14 Man. 41 (1902); Re Hewitt, 42 Ont. L. 286, 43 Dom. L. R.
716 (1918).
Haven v. Home Ins. Co., 149 Mo. App. 291, 130 S.W. 73 (1921).
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however, the rule is otherwise if the policy is entirely rewritten to accomplish the change of beneficiary.79 With reference to substituted or converted policies, it is held that a twenty-payment life insurance policy issued
in accordance with a provision in a term policy which it replaces is governed by the law of the place where the term policy is issued, since it is part
of the original contract, when it was to issue upon simple application, with
nothing left to future agreement.80 On the other hand, the interpretation
and validity of a life insurance policy obtained by the insured in exchange for
another policy will, if the exchange policy is a separate, detached, and distinct contract and in the absence of an express provision or any fact or circumstance indicating that the parties wished the law of the jurisdiction of
the original contract to apply, be governed by the law of the state in which
the substituted policy is delivered and accepted and in which the insured resides.8 1 Surrender is a consummation of a right given in the policy and
so is governed by the place of contracting of the policy.82
But to have the effect just stated they must be mere consummations of
rights created or reserved by the original contract, i.e., the hatching of an
egg laid in the contract. If they contain new elements or conditions, there is
.an offer and acceptance and so a new contract which must be subject to its
own choice of law. The insurance policies of every company offer various
modes of payment, one of which may be elected by the insured while the
policy is in force or by the beneficiary at maturity. These in nearly every
instance are limited to a single beneficiary and her estate. Selection of one
of these is an action within the insurance contract. However, if the anode
varies in any particular, such as naming a secondary beneficiary to receive
the balance or providing a different manner of payment, the contract is new
and governed, it may be, by a different law. This is the result generally because rarely is an insurance settlement confined to the policy option.
A loan agreement may or may not be governed by the law of the place
of the insurance contract depending on the right or privilege of the policyholders to secure the loan. If the policy contains a positive promise to make
a loan, in the nature of a continuing offer, so to speak, the loan is governed
by the law of the policy contract. In such circumstances, it is the consummation of a policy provision. Thus, the provisions of the law of the state of
"Webster v. Modern Woodmen, 192 Iowa 1376, 186 N. W. 659 (1922).

'Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 129 (1924). Regular life
in place of term: Sifliman v. I. L. Ins. Co., 131 Tenn. 303, 174 S. W. 131, L. R. A.
1915F 707 (1915). Paid-up in place of regular insurance: Dannhauser v. Wallernstein,
169 N. Y. 199, 62 N. E. 160 (1901).
"'Nielsen v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 89 F. (2d) 90, 110 A. L. R. 1133 (C. C. A.
10th 1937).
'Parsons v. Northwestern Nat. Life, 133 Iowa 532, 110 N. W. 907 (1907) ; Northwestern Mut. Life v. Joseph, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 714, 103 S. W. 317, 12 L. R. A. (1q.s.)
439 (1907); McCormick v. Travelers Life, 215 Mo. App. 258, 264 S. W. 916 (1924).
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the policy as to rights on default govern.83 On the other hand, where cash
loans can be obtained under a loan application reciting that the agreement is
made and delivered at the place of the home office of the company and where
the right to secure the loan is not absolute, but some discretion with respect
to making a loan is reserved to the insurer, the contract of loan is governed
by the law of the state where the insurer has its home office, even though
the agreement for the policy loan itself was in fact signed elsewhere.8 4 In
practice, usually, a loan agreement is regarded as separate and distinct from
the original contract o f insurance and governed, at least as regards its validity, by the law of the place where it-the loan agreement-is made.
C.

CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH INSURANCE

Over the contracts of married women much legal lore has been evolved
which now is of little importance because the "shield of coverture" designed
to protect the wearer from her own ignorance and weakness is now "seldom
worn with becoming, and never with flattering, grace". But as to the acts
of minors the problem is not only live but complicated by the complexity
of modern life and work. The rule maintained by the jurists of Continentai
Europe and by some European and American writers is that the domicil of
origin determines the personal capacity wherever the person may go. This is
on the theory that the law of the domicil of birth should prevail over the
place of actual domicil in fixing the age of majority, each state or nation
being presumed to be best capable of judging from physical circumstances,
climate or otherwise when the faculties of its citizens are morally or civilly
perfect for the purposes of society. This rule has the advantage of certainty. On the other hand it has the disadvantage that the person will suddenly become of age in crossing the line into a state having a low majority
age.8 5 The prevailing American rule is that the legal capacity of a person to
make a contract or perform any other act is to be determined by the law of
the place where the act was done or the contract made. Therefore, a person
who is a minor until twenty-five by the law of his domicil and incapable as
such of making a valid contract there, may nevertheless in another country
where he would be of age at twenty-one make a contract at that age.8 6 If,
however, the infant signs a contract in the state of his domicil and the entire
performance on his part is to be in that state, the law of that state will, be
"'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U. S. 209, 42 Sup. Ct. 467 (1922).
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918E
593 (1918).
"Pillet, Essai d'un System General de Solution des Conflits des Lois (1894) 21
CLUNET 417.

'Wilder's Succession, 22 La. Ann. 219, 2 Am. Rep. 721 (1870); Ross v. Ross, 129
Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321 (1880) ; Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 189, 5 Am. Dec.
332 (N. Y. 1811); annotation 17 Am. Dec. 180; 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 867.
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applied to determine its validity, even though the acceptance by the other
7
party, which completes the contract, is in another states
The fact that a person is or is not of age in one state does not affect the
question of his minority or his capacity in any particular in another state.88
A minor may be emancipated either by statute or in accordance with the
provision of the common law.89 The consequences of this emancipation, like
the consequences of minority, must depend on the law of the state where the
transaction takes place. Proceeding may be had in a state for the removal
of the incapacity of minority for some particular purpose. Such a proceeding does not enlarge the capacity of the person under the law of any other
state. 90 Thus, in State v. Buawe 9l an Arkansas minor owned movables in
the hands of a curator in Missouri. An Arkansas statute authorized certain
courts to remove the legal disabilities of minors in general or with respect
to a particular business and an Arkansas court did remove such disability
"so far as to authorize him to demand, sue for, and receive all moneys belonging to him in the State of Missouri, in the hands of his curator". A
Missouri court dismissed such suit saying, "The legislature of Arkansas did
not possess power to pass a law to override and control our laws". The application of these principles to insurance may be illustrated by this situation:
By statute in Ohio, a person fifteen years or over may take out insurance
for benefit of parents and may surrender or borrow upon it as if of age. But,
his power to deal with his policy is suspended if his domicil crosses into
Indiana which does not have such a statute. Again, a girl of eighteen in a
state where that is the age of majority may validly take out insurance but
she would lose power over it by removal to a state where the age of majority is twenty-one. 92 Thus, the insurance company cannot rely on the original
domicil.
The questions we have been discussing may become important in the development of deferred settlements by insurance companies. Often the recipients of interest and instalments are children living in different states, with
different majority laws, and during payment their residence may cross state
lines. His or her rights and the conditions of exercising them will be governed, probably, by the law in which the domicil is at the time. 93
'International Textbook Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1115 (1912).

'Philpott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 85 Mo. 164 (1884); O'Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis.
136 (1878).

O'Harmon v. McGawley, 9 La. 567 (1836); Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lemons, 109
Tex. 244, 206 S. W. 75, 5 A. L. R. 943 (1918).
"Wilkinson v. Kuster, 124 Ala. 574, 26 So. 940 (1899) ; State v. Bunce, 65 Mo. 349

(1866).
"65 Mo. 349 (1866).

'Heistand
v. Kuns, 8 Blackford 345 (Ind. 1847).
'3 This subject is interestingly discussed by Clyde P.

LiFE INs. COUNSEL 369.

Johnson in (1924) 4
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FraternalInsurance Subject to Different Rules
Some of the rules are different in fraternal benefit insurance, and this
must be borne in mind, otherwise the decisions may be misleading. There
is an indivisible unity between the members of such a society in respect to
the fund from which their rights are to be enforced and consequently their
rights are to be determined by a single law. Membership involves something
more than a contract; it looks to and must be governed by the law of the
state granting the charter of incorporation. An example is the rule that who
are eligible beneficiaries must be determined by the law of that state9 4 even
against a smaller list in the statute of the state of contract. 95
When Documents Embody Rights
Where a right is, by the law which created it, embodied in a document,
the right is subject to the jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction
96
over the document.
A document may be a letter or ancient writing valuable for itself (in this
sense not interesting to us here), it may be a memorandum of a legal transaction or written contract; it may, like a bill of lading, embody the title to
a chattel (also of no interest in this study) or it may itself embody an obligation or right, in which case the ownership of the document is regarded as
conferring a kind of legal ownership of the right of action represented by itas if the instrument were itself the obligation. There is sound basis for this
says Professor Williston9 7 "where by contract or custom enforcement of a
right is conditional on the surrender of the document evidencing the right".
Whether a right is embodied in a document depends upon the law which
created the right. When it was so merged by that law, the presence of the
paper' confers jurisdiction over the right. No right is embodied in a document except as provided by the law of the state which creates the right. The
validity of the conveyance of a right embodied in a document depends on
the validity of the conveyance of the document. Since a document is a
chattel the validity of its conveyance is governed by the law of the state
where the document is at the time of the conveyance. 98
If a chose in action is evidenced by a document in which, by the law of
the state where it was issued, the title to the obligation is embodied, a tran'Supreme Council R. A. v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, L. R. A. 1916A
771 (1915) ; Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 554, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 41 A. L. R.
1384 (1925); Hollingsworth v. Supreme Council R. A., 175 N. C. 615, 96 S. E. 81,
Ann. Cas. 1918E 401, 41 A. L. R. 1386, L. R. A. 1916A 770 (1918).
'United Order v. Merrick, 165 Mass. 421, 43 N. E. 127 (1896).
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 52.
97CoNTRATcrs (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 430.
'RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWs (1934) § 262; BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at
§ 52.1.
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saction purporting to create a trust therein is governed by the law of the
state where the document is at the time of the transaction. 9 "In respect of
specialty debts the test has always been not the place and residence of the
debtor, but the actual place where the actual document constituting the specialty exists, namely, where the piece of paper is to be found."'100 In particulars, other than taxation, it is well settled that a bond or note is regarded
like a chattel having a locality in space and therefore governed by the law
of the place at which it is dealt with. 1 1
As far as the transfer of title is concerned, commercial paper is now
viewed as subject to the same rules that govern other chattels. 102 Thus, the
law of the situs controls the validity of the transfer of a check, 0 s a certificate
of stock,0 4 or a bill of exchange. 10 5 It was recently held that where a Georgia
bank issued a transferable certificate of deposit for bonds in its vaults, and
the certificate is transferred in New York, the validity of the transfer of the
certificate is governed by the law of New York.'0 6 The circumstances here
come very close to those in settlement of insurance proceeds. Many life
companies take up the policy at maturity and issue in its place a certificate
evidencing its obligation in the conditions applicable at that time. In an action
to cancel certificates of deposit it was held that the action was properly
brought at the situs of the fund, rather than the situs of the certificates. 0 7
Delivery of an insurance policy with donative intent transfers the rights
embodied in the document. 08 The rule seems to be the same as for savings
bank books, non-negotiable or unendorsed bill or note of third person, a nonnegotiable bond, a certificate of stock, or lottery ticket. 0 9 It cannot "be
controverted that a gift of a written contract, which calls for the payment of
money to the donor, can be made by parol, and that a written assignment
is not necessary when there is a delivery of the written contract by the donor
CONFLICT oF LAws (1934) § 294, comment f.
'°New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee, 131 L. T. Rep. 445 (C. A. 1924).
mBEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 52.1. See Alcock v. Smith, 1 Ch. 238 (1892);
Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, 1 K. B. 677 (1905).
'The rule is otherwise for purposes of taxation. Compare Blodgett v. Silberman, 277
U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1928) with Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup.
Ct.1 603, 42 A. L. R. 316 (1925).
°'Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, 1 K. B. 677 (1905).
1
°Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22, 45 Sup.
Ct. 207 (1925).
'-OAlcock v. Smith, 1 Ch. 238 (1892).
'°0Application of Goodchild, 160 Misc. 738, 290 N. Y. Supp. 683 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
ILFirst Nal. Bank of Broken Bow v. Bank of Horatio, 161 Ark. 259, 255 S. W. 881
(1923).
'-"By overwhelming authority," says Gledhill v. McCoombs, 110 Me. 341, 86 Atl.
247 (1913).
0WILLisToN, CoN Acrs (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 439 and numerous
citations. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1934) § 158 comment lb.
'RESTATEMENT,
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to the donee, with the intention to make a gift of it and the money it se11 0
cures."
The trend of decision, following the growth of commercial interests, is to
increase the class of documents held to embody rights.'11 This is natural as
may be seen if we consider the evolution of criteria of choice of law. Early, it
was the domicil of the trustor and the phrase mobilia seqmuntur persoarn
had a potency which has lessened only in recent years. These years have
seen the rise of situs of the property. More and more property has been
endowed with a situs nature-first formal contracts and securities, then those
not so formal. It is submitted that this ever-widening class should include
insurance contracts and the certificates which evidence or are the company's
obligation towards funds left on deposit with them-certificates of deposit,
so to speak. It is difficult to visualize rights more completely embodied in a
document. It is difficult also, to conceive a more simple criterion in choiceof-law problems.
If an insurance policy is under seal, it obviously can be dealt with as a
document embodying a right. But if not possible to deal with the policy on
the basis of a common law specialty, such instruments are in fact used in
business as mercantile specialties without regard to seal. Consistently with
the mercantile view courts have held that the mere delivery of an insurance
policy constitutes a completed gift of the chose in action embodied in it.
Similarly, the policy is an asset for administration in the jurisdiction where
the policy is situated at the death. Title to it vests in the administrator
then appointed and no other jurisdiction should undertake to administer the
asset. There are several cases which seem to take this view in whole or
2
part.11
Asysignments of Inurance-By what Law Governed
As a general rule an assignment of a policy of insurance is regarded as
a contract distinct and separate from the original contract. Consequently
it is governed by the law of the place where it (the assignment) is made,
nUn
re Huggin's Estate, 204 Pa. 167, 53 At. 746 (1902).
tm
This was accepted in Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65, 89 A. L. R.
1007 (1933). See further consideration of the document in cases of Trusts, infra pp.
190-192.
"rThe following are listed and discussed by BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 471.10:
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 97 U. S. 682, 24 L. ed. 1114 (1878) ; New Eng.
Mut. Life v. WoQdworth. 111 U. S. 138, 4 Sup. Ct. 364 (1884); New York Life v.
Smith, 67 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 9th 1895) ; Equitable Life v. Vogel, 76 Ala. 441 (1884) ;
Rice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ark. 498, 238 S. W. 772 (1922); Holyoke v.
Mutual Life, 22 Hun 75 (1880), aff'd, 84 N. Y. 648; Sulz v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life, 145 N. Y. 563, 40 N. E. 242 (1895) ; Matter of Gordon, 186 N. Y. 471, 79 N. E.
722 (1906); Ellis v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 Tenn. 177, 43 S. W. 766
(1897); Gurney v. Rawlins, 2 M. & W. 87 (1836); Re Ontario Mutual Life Assur.
Co., 30 Ont. 666 (1899). See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee, 131 L. T. Rep.
(C. A. 1924); Evans v. Charles Scribners Sons, 58 Fed. 303 (N. D. Ga. 1893).
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without reference to the place where the original contract of insurance was
made, or to the law governing that contract; and this although the original
contract stipulates that a certain state shall be the place of contract."13
Having made that general statement we must stop to consider a fine distinction and slight exception before going on to apply the principle. Whether
a right under a contract is capable of being transferred by the owner is
determined by the law of the place of contracting. 114 Whether a transfer
has been made, i.e., the validity of the assignment (assuming the contract
to be assignable), is governed by the law of the place where the assignment
was made. 115 The place of assignment is the place where the last act or
event occurred which is necessary to the formation of the contract of
assignment." 81
The law of the place of assignment governs the capacity of the assignor
to assign"i 7 and the formalities." 8 It governs the sufficiency of the consideration given by the assignee of an insurance policy," 9 the legality of
an assignment to one without insurable interest 120 and the validity of an
assignment of a policy without the beneficiary's consent121 or without delivery. 122 But in New Jersey the law of that state will govern the assignment of a policy if all parties are domiciled there, even if the assignment
is executed elsewhere.'m
II.

By TRUST ComPANIEs*

If one thinks the choice of law is uncertain in case of contracts, he will
n"CoutcH, INsuRANcE (1929) § 209. The cases are collected and discussed in 1904)
63 L.R. A. 858; (1910) 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 978; (1914) 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 281-283.
"'Davis v. Brown, 159 Ind. 644, 65 N. E. 908 (1903) ; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 144 N. W. 1108 (1914); BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at
§ 348.2; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 348.
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 214 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 9th 1916), aff'd, 241
U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct 613 (1916) ; Wilde v. Wilde, 209 Mass. 205, 95 N. E. 295 (1911) ;
BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 350.1; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 350.
See annotations (1903) 65 L. R. A. 858; (1920) 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 978; (1914) 52
L. R. A. (N. s.) 281.
mBEAiLE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 348.1.
1SREsTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 351.

2

id. at § 352.

'Glover v. Wells, 40 Ill. App. 350 (1891), af'd, 140 Ili. 102, 29 N. E. 680 (1892).
'Haase v. First Natl. Bank, 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 761 (1920); Manhattan Life Ins.
Co. v. Cohen, 139 S. W. 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), appeal dinrissed, 234 U. S. 123,
34 Sup. Ct 874 (1914).
=Fourth Nail. Bank v. Woolfolk, 220 Ala. 344, 125 So. 217 (1929) ; Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 59 S. W. (2d) 476 (Mo. App. 1933); Barbin v.
Moore, 85 N. H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (1932).
"'Appeal of Colburn, 74 Conn. 463, 51 Atl. 139 (1902).
'Henry v. Thompson, 78 N. J. Eq. 142, 78 Atl. 14 (1910).
*A study of the holding and distribution of proceeds by a trustee who receives them
in one sum is necessary because the trust controls the policy which is a part of the
trust res, and the governing law of the trust may be the governing law of certain features of the insurance contract. Also, certain conflict rules of trusts generally, and
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be quite sure of it on undertaking the study of trusts. Fortunately, we are
interested only in a portion of the field, namely, living or inter vivos trusts
and here again only in those which have as their subject-matter contracts
or rights in contracts which lawyers call choses in action. Of course the
subject-matter or trust res may contain other forms of property such as
chattels, cash, securities, and land located in different places to complicate
the choice-of-law problem. It will help if we remember that the constituent
act of creating a living trust is the transaction of changing the title of the
trust res from the trustor to the trustee.
Validity 'and Its Determination,
The validity of a trust of choses in action created by a settlement or other
transaction inter vivos is determined by the law of the place in which the
transaction takes place.' 2 4 However, this is not so simple as it sounds be25
cause of questions about the place.'
In recent years the location of the property has been a factor increasingly
considered determinative of the governing law resulting finally in the great
case of Hutchison v. Ross 126 which was thoroughly argued in all courts.
The facts in that case were these: Ross, of Montreal, marrying as a young
man, before his father's death, agreed to create a trust fund of $125,000 for
his wife. The father died leaving $10,000,000 to his son. The son thereupon,
desiring to settle $1,000,000 instead of $125,000 on his wife and children,
procured documents to that effect to be prepared and executed, the trustee
being a New York bank. Half the amount was already in the bank, and
the remainder was sent there after the document had been signed. After
several years it was attempted to nullify the million-dollar trust on the
ground that it was invalid by the law of the Province of Quebec, the domicil
specifically of the trustee settlement of insurance, may apply to the analogous settlement
by the life company. In fact, there is considerable evidence that the life company
settlement is itself a quasi-trust with the insured until maturity and the insurance company thereafter the trustee. For an extended discussion of this see the author's POwER
oF AN INsURED TO CONTROL THE PR CEEDS OF His POLICy (1926) c. 2.
'RESTATEMENT. CoxrFLIcT OF LAWs (1934) § 294 (2).
asProfessor Beale has stated (op. cit. supra note 1, at § 294.4) that it seems safest
in the case of intangibles not part of an aggregate to apply the law of the domicil of
the owner to the passing of title, but the cases in note 126, infra, reveal situs of the
property or documents to be an important criterion.
'-Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65, 89 A. L. R. 1007 (1933), aff'g
Ross v. Ross, 233 App. Div. 626, 253 N. Y. Supp. 871 (1st Dep't 1931), which reversed
137 Misc. 795, 243 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1930). This case has been widely
discussed in the law journals, e.g., (1933) 8 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 97; (1933) 1 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 494; (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1251; (1934) 32 MicH. L. Rv.696; (1934)
18 MINN. L. Rav. 565; (1933) 47 IIARv. L. Rv. 350; (1934) 20 VA. L. Rv.468;
(1934) 19 CORNELL L. Q. 282; (1934) 28 ILL. L. Rav. 966. Forbes v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 82 Fed. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 1st 1936). See other cases cited in annotation
(1934) 89 A. L. R. 1027-8. But see Hasbrouck v. Martin, 120 N. J. Eq. 96, 183 At1.
735 (1936).
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of the parties. The court, however, held that the securities dealt with by
the settlement were in New York, and that the law of New York, as state
of situs, validated the settlement.
The court considered the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam and rejected
it as outmoded or at least of lessened potency as a juristic formula.' 2 7 In
its stead the rule of tangible property has been extended to negotiable instruments and more recently, by slow process to other intangible personal property, at least when "no one can get the benefits of ownership except through
and by means of the" paper" which evidences such intangible property.1 28
Although the court specifically limited its decision to "documents which in
the market place are treated as property and -not merely evidence of property",
its reasoning reveals the pressure of legal thought to extend the principle
to still less formal intangibles. It said:
"In all the affairs of life there has been a vast increase of mobility.
Residence is growing less and less the focal point of existence and its
practical effect is steadily diminishing. Men living in one jurisdiction
often conduct their affairs in other jurisdictions and keep their securities
there. Trusts are created in business and financial centers by settlors
residing elsewhere."
This case was followed by the New Jersey court in Cutts v. Najdrowski, 29
where a resident of that state caused his bank account in New York to
be changed to a trustee for a New Jersey cestui. It was held that the law
of New York governed. One commentator'"0 on the Hutchison case states
that "undoubtedly the prevalent modern tendency is to substitute the law
of the situs of the property".
A different but not inconsistent point of view was advanced in Wilmington
Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Ca.131 Here an inter vivos trust of securities,
giving the life beneficiary both general and special powers of appointment,
was created with all operative factors occurring in New York. Subsequently,
with the consent of the donor, a Delaware trust company was appointed
successor trustee and additional securities were deposited with it. The life
beneficiary of the inter vivos trust, in the exercise of the powers of appointment, set up trusts which were valid under Delaware law but in violation
of the New York law against suspension of absolute ownership. The court
-The maxim "was intended for convenience and not to be controlling when justice
not demand it".
does
2
' sDirection der Disconto-Gedellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22, 28, 45 Sup.
Ct. 207 (1925). See general discussion of documents embodying rights, supra, pp. 186-188.
L'123 N. J. Eq. 481, 198 Atl. 885 (1938).
9(1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 468 citing Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186, 156

N. E. 660 (1927).

21186 Atl. 903 (Del. Ch. 1936) ; notes, (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 125; (1937) 25 GEO.
L. J. 464; (1936) 15 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 59.
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held that the validity of the appointed trusts was governed by New York
law since the original presence of all operative factors in New York showed
32
that the donor intended New York law to govern.'
The earlier case of Lazier v. Logierls3 utilized situs of the trust res as
the criterion in an interesting way with an unexpected result. A testator
domiciled in Ohio left certain securities in trust. The trustees were domiciled
in New York and the securities were there. A cestui attempted to assign
his interest, which admittedly was assignable by Ohio law but not assignable
by New York law. The Ohio court held that Ohio law governed the validity
of the assignment on the ground that securities being personal property,
their domicil is ambulatory and follow their lawful custodian, which it held
to be the probate court in Ohio, considering the trustees its agents merely.
Professor Cook's criticism of this case illustrates the difficulty for students
and lawyers in the inexact language used by the courts.ls4 The decision,
he says, is ambiguous in the phrase "Ohio law" in that it may refer to rules
established in that state for trusts having no extra-territorial elements or,
with befter reason, may be the rule established in Ohio for trusts with extraterritorial elements which may for reasons of policy be identical in scope
with that applied by New York law to New York trusts. In Kenney v.
Morse'3 5 a resident of Rhode Island bequeathed securities to a trustee domiciled in New York for benefit of her daughter also domiciled in New York.
The validity of the trust was determined by the law of Rhode Island. 36 A
creditor attempted to reach the income from the trust of a New York cestui
on the theory that the Rhode Island law made her interest assignable but
the court applied the New York law and refused to aid the creditor.
It is well to stop at this point to clear an apparent conflict in the decisions.
The United States Supreme Court has held intangibles taxable at the owner's
domicil even when the instruments are in another state. On the same theory
other courts have held that their situs for transfer inter vivos must likewise
be at the owner's domicil. Says Professor Cavers:
"The source of this confusion lies in the use of the term situs. Now
situs, with respect to an intangible, is solely a judicial concept, an
elliptical phrasing of the decision that the intangible should be subject
for the purpose in hand to the law of the jurisdiction so designated.
There is no reason why that situs must be the same for all purposes.
Because the supreme court for reasons which are doubtless good and
sufficient declines to stay the hand of the tax collector at the domicil
The court reasoned that the exercise of the power must be regarded as the act of
the donor, and therefore regarded the interests created by the appointment as having
been created by the donor.
1-99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N. E. 167 (1919).
""(1919) 19 COL. L. REv. 487.
"1 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1902).
'in Cross v. U. S. Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 30 N. E. 125 (1892).

DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
of a decedent from taxing the stocks and bonds which the decedent had
kept elsewhere, it does not follow that any transfer of these stocks and
bonds which the owner might have made during his lifetime would have
been equally subject to the law of his domicil. The consideration justideterfying a tax on intangibles may be quite irrelevant to the 13proper
7
mination of what law governs their transfer inter vivos."'
A perpetuity and an unlawful accumulation are elements of validity which
are governed by the law of the place where the trust is created. 138
Stipulating the Governing Law
As to questions relating entirely to the validity of a trust, such as the
rule against perpetuities, a trustor can not provide that the more liberal rule
of another state shall govern, 13 9 and probably he can not validate a provision
that the cestui's interest shall not be subject to the claims of creditors by
selecting as the governing one a more favorable state. On the other hand
there is the beginning of a tendency to authorize by statute a selection of
a governing law; thus, New York provides that the expressed wish of the
creator of a trust to have the New York law govern will be followed if
the personal property is situated in New York when the trust is created. 140
a.

EFFECT OF LOCAL PUBLIC POLICY

An interesting and important question exists when a trust valid where
made is to be administered in a state whose laws forbid certain features.
The general rule subjects the trust to the laws of the state where it is to be
administered.' 4 ' Hence, a trust valid in the state where created can not be
carried out in a state where it conflicts with local rules. 142 Conversely, if a
trust is invalid where made (e.g., violates its rule against perpetuities) but
is valid in the state of administration, the greater number of such states have
refused to upset the trusts, claiming that their local laws are not designed
to apply to trusts executed abroad348
-Trusts Inter Vivos and Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HAgv. L. REv. 161, 172.
2"Succession of Herber, 128 La. 111, 54 So. 579 (1911); Cross v. U. S. Trust Co.,

131 N. Y. 330, 30 N. E. 125 (1892).

"'City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Check, .(1935) 93 N. Y. L. Joua. 2441.
"ON. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 12a. Oddly enough in Shannon v. Irving Trust
Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N.'E. (2d) 792 (1937), the trustor was permitted to negative ihe
New York law by designating the law of another state in circumstances which would
otherwise have called for the law of New York. The annotator in (1936) 84 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 901 thinks it doubtful if the legislature intended to create a proper conflict
rule and at the same time grant the privilege of evading it.
mFor discussion of the rule in connection with contract choice-of-law, see supra
pp. 175-179.
"'Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property (1907) 20 HAgv. L. ,zEv. 382;
GooDRICH, CONrLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 161; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWs (1901) § 144;
2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1905) § 591b.
"-Vansant v. Roberts, 3 Md. 119 (1852); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y.
421 (1871) ; Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phila. 497 (Pa. 1847).
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But New York has a special rule. Its courts have held that the New
York restrictions will not apply if the gift is to a foreign charitable corporation, which, therefore, is administered abroad.144 Conversely, they do not
apply to trusts created abroad and valid there though violating the rule
against perpetuities in New York where to be administered. 45 In other
words, New York is inclined to support the trust if valid in either state.
An illustration is Cross v. U. S. Trust Company, 46 wherein the New York
Court of Appeals held that a disposition of personal property by will in the
form of a trust to be executed in New York, made by a person domiciled
in another state, valid at the place of domicil, was valid in New York,
notwithstanding the absolute ownership of the property was suspended for
a period longer than permitted by the New York statute. The same court
in Hope v. Brewer,1 47 adopted the converse rule, namely, that a testamentary
gift by a New York resident to trustees in a foreign country for a purpose
there legal was valid, though it transgressed the perpetuity rule of New
York, the court saying:
"Our law with respect to creation of trusts, the suspension of the
power of alienation of real estate, and the absolute ownership of personal,
was designed only to regulate the holding of property under our laws
and in our state, and a trust intended to take effect in another state or
in a foreign country would not seem to be within either its letter or
spirit. When a citizen of this state or a person domiciled here makes a
gift of personal estate to foreign trustees for the purpose of a foreign
charity, our courts will not interpose our local laws with respect to
trusts and accumulations to arrest the disposition made by the owner
of his property, but will inquire as to two things: 1st, whether all the
forms and requisites necessary to constitute a valid testamentary instrument under our laws have been complied with; and 2d, whether the
foreign trustees are competent to take the gift for the purposes expressed and to administer the trust under the law of the country where
the gift was to take effect."
However, the courts of New York will not directly aid in carrying out
there a bequest which is in violation of its statute against perpetuities; yet
they will not hold such a bequest void when it is valid by the law of the
'"Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892); Robb v. Wash. & Jeff.
College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906) ; Matter of Crum, 98 Misc. 160, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 149 (Surr. Ct. 1916) ; Matter of Feehan's Estate, 135 Misc. 903, 241 N. Y.
Supp. 669 (Surr. Ct. 1929).

"'Am. Bible Soc. v. Healy, 153 Mass. 197, 26 N. E. 404 (1891); Cross v. U. S.
Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 30 N. E. 125 (1892) ; Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30,
35 N. E. 407 (1893).
2"Supra note 145.
1136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892). Hope v. Brewer was followed in Robb v.

Wash. & Jeff. College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906) and St. John v. Andrews
Institute for Girls, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908). It overruled, in the name
of distinguishing, the decision of Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584 (1866).
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state by which the disposition of the property is to be governed; so while
distribution in New York under such a bequest will not be decreed, the
assets will be directed to be remitted to the state where testator was
domiciled. 14 8
Where testatrix dying in another state creates, in a corporation in New
York, trusts relating to personalty, valid under the laws of testatrix's domicil
but void under the laws of New York, the courts of that state will not
assume jurisdiction in the premises, but the trusts must be administered
and their validity determined under the laws of testatrix's domicil. 49
The tendency of the New York courts to uphold trusts wherever possible
50
Here, the trust agreement,
was manifested in Shannon v. Irving Trust Co.'L
after setting out provisions for accumulation which were valid by the law
of New Jersey but invalid under New York law, expressly stipulated that
New Jersey law should govern the validity of the trust. The settlor and
beneficiaries were domiciled in New Jersey; the domicil of the trustee, the
execution of the trust instrument, the situs of the movables at the time
of the transfer, and the administration of the trust were all in New York.
The court held that the trust was valid on the ground that the settlor's and
beneficiaries' New Jersey domicil was a sufficient basis for sustaining the
intent of the parties that New Jersey law be applied. The court stated its
conclusion' of the law thus:
"The cases have uniformly held that the public policy of New York
confines the New York rule against perpetuity to trusts established by
residents to be administered here."
Determining the Place of Administration
To determine the law governing the administration of the trust, the courts
have referred to and considered the following factors :-2
1. Domicil of the trustor;
2. Place in which the trust instrument was executed and delivered;
"'Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, 609 (1866) ; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43
N. 4Y. 424 (1871) ; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192 (1873).
" Cross v. U. S. Trust Co., 25 Abb. N. C. 166, 10 N. Y. Supp. 781 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
2W246 App. Div. 280, 285 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1936), noted (1936) 84 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 901; (1936) 5 BROOKLYN L. REV. 325.
"'A note in (1937) 50 HARv. L. Rxv. 1156 states: "It seems unlikely that other states
will follow the New York view as to what is encompassed by the policy against
accumulations, since there is strong argument that the vice aimed at by the law against
accumulations is the holding of property within the state, irrespective of the owner's
domicil or intent, on uses frowned on by the law." See Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and
Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HAgv. L. Rav. 161, 165.
mlThe cases in which each is discussed are listed in an admirable discussion by Walter
W. Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts of Personal
Property (1936) 45 YALi L. J. 438. See also notes, (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 126; (1934)

89 A. L. R. 1023.
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196
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Language of the trust instrument;
Place of probation of the will;
Location or situs of the trust property;
Domicil of the trustee;
Domicil of the cestui or beneficiary;
Place in which the business of the trust is carried on;
Intention or stipulation of the creator.

It will be noted that the first four factors relate to the creation of the
trust; the fifth to the subject-matter or trust res; and the sixth, seventh,
and eighth, to the performance of the trust. Certain factors necessarily exist
in combination, e.g., the place of probate is always the domicil of the testator
or the location of the property and the place of carrying on the business
of the trust is the domicil of the trustee or location of the trust property.
Since this discussion concerns itself with living or inter vivos trusts only,
the fourth can be dismissed from mind.' 53 Cook'54 discarded 6 and 8. He
saw much in favor of 7, but concluded the result sufficiently undesirable to
induce a rejection of it. He thought 5 not feasible because the most important class of personal property-choses in action-has no situs. His contribution to the study was the suggestion that the court should select the
jurisdiction withi which on the whole "the trust has the most substantial
connection".
Knowing the factors which the courts have considered in determining the
law governing the administration of trusts and realizing that all or nearly
all appear in every case and that they may exist in different states in great
variety, the problem is to determine the relative weights. The result is
confusion' 55 out of which the Restatement attempted to bring some order
by the following pronouncement:
"A trust of movables created by an instrument inter vivos is administered by the trustee according to the law of the state where the instrument creating the trust locates the administration of the trust."1 5
In order to determine where the administration of the trust is located,
consideration is given to the provisions of the instrument, the residence of
the trustees, the residence of the beneficiaries, the location of the property,
the place where the business of the trust is to be carried on.'5'
'Only one case, Keeney v. Moore, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't
1902) has been found in which the forum was expressly referred to by the court as
a factor.

=(1919) 19 COL. L. REV. 486.

1"6'It is practically impossible," says the annotator in 89 A. L. R. 1023, "to deduce
a uniform rule from the results reached in the adjudicated cases . . . the law applied
often being the law of a state which is the situs of numerous elements conjunctively."

d.
'Id. at § 297, comment§ 297.

10CONFLCcr OF LAWS
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Any question which arises after the trust has come into being is a question
of the administration of the trust. 58 Among the matters of administration
governed by the law of the state where that is located, are all questions as
to the rights of the cestui of the trust; and specifically, whether the trustor
161
may revoke,' 59 who takes as cestui,160 the alienability of the cestui's interest,
162
the right of creditors of the cestui to reach the trust res or its income,
the right of the cestui, a married woman, to receive the income free from
the interference of her husband, 163 the right of the cestui to put an end
to the trust and receive a conveyance of the trust res. 6 4
Increasing Importance of Beneficiary's Domicil
The domicil of the beneficiary has not received much consideration in
the choice of law and one writer' 65 says that it does not merit any because
there may be several beneficiaries. Yet even he admits that the domicil of
the beneficiary may throw light on the trustor's intention as to location of
the trust's administration or aid the court in determining to what law he
intended to submit the validity of the trust.
Professor Gray questioned' 6 the Pennsylvania decision of DeRenne's
Estate'67 in which the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia held the Pennsylvania
statute against accumulation did not apply. "Does not", he asks, "the statute
forbid the doing of certain acts in Pennsylvania as against public policy?"
But DeRenne's Estate was followed in the Supreme Court by Fowler's
Appeal. 68 In both cases, the cestui que trust lived out of Pennsylvania.
arBEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 297.2.
'In re Muspratt-Williams, W. N. 14 (1901).

"'West v. Fitz, 109 Ill. 425 (1884).

"Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S. 542, 4 Sup. Ct. 522 (1884); Farmers & M. S. Bank
v. Brewer, 27 Conn. 600 (1858) ; First Natl Bank v. Nat'l Broadway Bank, 156 N. Y.
459, 51 N. E. 398 (1898); Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 391, 173 N. Y. Supp. 103
(1st Dep't 1918); Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N. E. 167 (1919); In re
Fitzgerald, (1904) 1 Ch. 573; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 297, comment b.
" Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1902); Gould
v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N. Y. Supp. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Matter of Havemeyer,
127 Misc. 197, 216 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Surr. Ct. 1926); BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1,
at § 297.2.
v. Ellis, 2 Ch. 333 (1902).
""Reynolds
' 6 Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 501 (W. D. Pa. 1904); Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo.
1038, 56 S. W. (2d) 387 (1932) ; Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 391, 173 N. Y. Supp.
103 (1st Dep't 1918); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 297.
'"Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and Conflict of Laws (1930) 44 HAxv. L. REv. 168, 189.
'- P
ETUzIfES (3d ed. 1915) § 725.

"'12 W. N. C. 94 (1882) (a Georgia citizen bequeathed personal property to a
Pennsylvania corporation on trusts not allowed by the Pennsylvania statute). See
Asher, Public Policyjn the Law of Conflicts in Pennsylvania (1939) 13 TEMPLE L. Q.
216.
26125 Pa. 388, 17 Atl. 431 (1889) (the trustor was domiciled
in Illinois and the deed
of trust was made there. The securities were of foreign corporations; the cestui que
trust was in Colorado and the trustee was a Pennsylvania corporation).
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Professor Minor has developed Professor Gray's thought along a different
line. 69 Speaking of laws relating to the capacity of the beneficiary to take
(as distinguished from the capacity of the testator to give) he says the purpose is to subserve a general policy which the welfare of the state as a
whole requires should be carried out. Such are prohibitions on a corporation
to be a legatee or to hold more than a certain amount of property bequeathed
to ft, or the policy of statutes of mortmain. It is evident that the state
enacting such a law is not interested in enforcing it if the corporation or
other beneficiary thus prohibited to take is not within its borders; on the
other hand if such beneficiary is within its limits, the policy of the law
applies no matter where the testator's domicil may be or what may be its
law. "The capacity of the legatee to take should be regulated by the law
of the beneficiary's domicil just as much as the testator's capacity to give
is controlled by the law of his domicil."'170
An Ohio court in an early case' 7' said that though it is a general rule
that parties residing in different states can contract with reference to the
law of either state and, having so contracted, their contract will be determined by such law, there is this exception: Where a state, to shield and
protect its own citizens, passes a law which shall govern and control the
making of such contracts, the law throws its protecting shield over the citizens
of the state and will determine the rights of parties if the laws of two states
conflict.
Why shouldn't the domicil of the recipient of insurance proceeds determine
the ruling law? Some questions concern her very much and the policyholder
very little. For instance, to the beneficiary the alienability of the fund held
for her benefit and, conversely, its protection against attack is vital. It seems
unfair to extend to or forbid, as the case may be, a beneficiary living in
California or Louisiana a legal right or a protection given by the* law of
her domicil because a New York or a New England company living in a
radically different legal system, by a general provision printed in all its
policies, desired to irfipose the law of its state upon the universe.
-CoNFLiCr

'MNliOa,

oF LAWS (1901) 138-140.
CONFLIcr OF LAws (1901) 139, citing: Sickles v. New Orleans, 80 Fed. 868

(C. C. A. 5th 1897); Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541 (1876); Sohier v. Burr, 127
Mass. 221 (1879) ; Healy v. Reed, 153 Mass. 197, 26 N. E. 404 (1891) ; Chamberlain
v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424 (1871) ; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327 (1880) ; Hope
v. Brewer, supra note 147; see Vansant v. Roberts, 3 Md. 119 (1852); Cameron v.
Watson, 40 Miss. 191 (1866).
The doctrine is
'1'Ins. Co. v. Block, 12 Ohio Civ. Ct. 224, 6 0. C. D. 166 (1893).
also asserted in the important case of N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389,
20 Sup. Ct. 962 (1900).
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III. SUMMARY
Few transactions may have contact with more states or countries than
settlements of insurance by the life company itself or through an insurance
trust. These states may, and generally do, differ radically in their views on
perpetuities, restraints on alienation, and limitation of accumulation, as well
as on numerous other elements which do not come within the strict limits
of this work. There also is wide divergence in theory between different
cases in the same state and sometimes within the same case. To exhibit some
order in this confusion the following facts and conclusions are submitted
on the problem of what law governs the insured's dealing with his policy,
more specifically in the disposition of its proceeds.
1. A choice-of-law question may arise with respect to the making, the
construction, the performance, the transfer, or the enforcement. For each
it may be claimed that the governing law is the law of the place where the
contract, trust or assignment was made (lex loci contractu or lex loci celebrationis), the law of the place of performance (lex loci salutionis) or the
law of the place where.enforcement is sought (lex loci fori).
2. Validity is governed by the law of the place where the contract was
made, the trust created, or the assignment completed.
3. The place of contracting is determined by the law of the forum. In
determining this preliminary question the forum ascertains the place in which,
under the general law of contracts or trusts as the case may be, occurred
the principal event necessary to make the contract or trust.
4. The place where the contract is made is where the last act is done
that is necessary to make the promise complete and binding. Just what
event is the final one necessary to make the contract or trust binding is to
be determined by the principles of the law of contract or trust and by the
particular instrument if it has anything to say about it.
5. Insurance policies are completed where delivered except when a condition precedent remains unsatisfied in which case it is the place where that
satisfaction occurs.
6. Intent of the parties is becoming increasingly determinative of the
choice of law. This intent may be disclosed by facts and circtimstances (an
obviously uncertain situation) or by an express stipulation that the law of
a particular jurisdiction shall govern.
7. Choice of law by stipulation has been attacked as a means of evading
statutes and decisions made for the protection of a state's citizens but is
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being accepted in many courts provided the selected state has a substantial
connection with the transaction and the contract or trust does not violate
a statute or public policy of the state of contract or of the forum. A tendency
exists to hold the transaction valid if either state favors.
8. Place of performance is the state where the promise is to be performed.
Presumably it is the domicil of the creditor. The place where the insurance
policy is made payable by the contract is not the place of performance
necessarily.
9. The question of what is the obligation imposed by a contract of insurance-is answered by the law of the place of contracting, in absence of valid
selection of another place. The obligation includes the right and method of
changing beneficiary and who is eligible to be beneficiary. However, the
law of place of performance determines who is (as distinguished from who
may be) the beneficiary, and the manner of fulfilling the obligation.
10. The meaning of language, e.g., "heirs", is determined by the law
or usage of the speaker's domicil, and at the time he spoke if a change in
domicil has occurred.
11. Consummations of policy rights or options are governed by the law
of the policy, i.e., where it was made. Such are, changing beneficiary, conversion to other forms of policy or insurance, surrender, and sometimes loans.
However, to have this result they must be mere consummations without new
elements or conditions.
12. The capacity to make or deal with an insurance contract or its results
is determined by the law of the place where the act is done. The competency
of a minor, for instance, may be important in electing an instalment settlement of a policy or in receiving the instalments or interest of a settlement
arranged by the insured. In a less important way the competency of a
married woman may be involved.
13. Fraternal benefit insurance is in a class by itself and governed as
to many questions by the law of the state by which the society was incorporated.
14. The trend of decision, following the growth of commercial interests,
is to increase the class of documents held to embody rights in which case
the ownership of the document is regarded as conferring a kind of legal
ownership of the right of action represented by it-as if the instrument were
itself the obligation. There is some reason to believe that insurance contracts
and with even more reason the certificates of deposit of insurance proceeds
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held by the beneficiaries are now included in that class. To the extent this
is so will these obligations be controlled as to contracts or trusts by the law
of the state which has jurisdiction over the document.
15. Generally speaking, an assignment of insurance is regarded as a
separate contract and governed by the law of the place where the assignment
is made. Thus it governs the sufficiency of the consideration, the capacity
of the assignee to take, the effect on validity of lack of delivery or of beneficiary's consent. But whether a right under a contract is capable of being
assigned is determined by the law of the place of contracting. The place
of assignment is where the last act or event occurred which is necessary to
the transfer.
16. In trusts the choice-of-law problem is even more complex. There is
still another and very important party, the trustee. The subject-matter may
comprise different kinds of property situated in different states--cash, chattels, contracts, and land.
17. The validity is determined by the law of the place in which the
transaction takes place and the constituent act of creating a living trust is
the transaction of changing the title of the subject-matter from the trustor
to the-trustee.
18. The modem tendency is to consider situs of the property determinative of the validity of the trust. Securities are property and their location
decides.
19. The general rule subjects a trust to the laws of the state where it
is to be administered. Hence, a trust valid where created cannot be carried
out in a state where it conflicts with local rules. Conversely, if a trust is
invalid where made but is valid in the state of administration, the majority
of such states have refused to upset the trusts claiming that their local laws
are not designed to apply to trusts executed abroad.
20. To determine the law governing administration the courts have considered various factors each with strong support but the Restatement brings
some order out of the chaos by the rule that a trust of movables created
by an instrument inter vivos is administered by the trustee according to
the law of the state where the instrument locates the administration of the
trust. In order to determine that place consideration is given to the provisions of the instrument, the residence of the trustee, the residence of the
beneficiaries, the location of the property, the place where the business of
the trust is to be carried on.
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21. Some of the elements of validity, to be governed by the law of the
place where the trust is created are perpetuities and accumulation. Among
the matters of administration governed by the law of the state where that
is located are all questions of rights of the cestui of the trust and specifically:
May the trustor revoke; who takes as cestui; the alienability of her interest;
the right of her creditors to reach the trust res or income, the right of the
cestui, a married woman, to receive the income without interference by
husband; her right to put an end to the trust and receive the trust res.
22. In contradiction to the above, perhaps, the domicil of the beneficiary
is beginning to have some consideration and probably will have more. The
capacity of the beneficiary to take and her ability to hold should be protected by the law of her state.

